The short version
I bought 16 Chrome extensions to see how these sales work and what an owner inherits when the transfer goes through.
The buying process felt routine. Several of the extensions had permissions that gave their owner broad access to pages users visited.
An existing user base gives the new owner an update channel into browsers where the extension is already installed. Users may never notice the owner changed.

Why I looked at this
John Tuckner’s work at Secure Annex got me interested in extension ownership changes and the risks that come with them.
I was also waiting for one of my own Chrome extensions to pass review. That made me think about the trust people place in store-published extensions, and how little they may notice when ownership changes hands.
Most people treat “installed from the Chrome Web Store” as a trust signal.
Extensions are also assets. They get sold, transferred, abandoned, and revived with very little visibility for the people using them. I wanted to see the transfer process firsthand.
What the transfers showed
The listings varied in size and purpose, but the same things kept coming up:
- Install count affected the asking price.
- The existing users came with the sale.
- The transfer itself was unremarkable from the buyer’s side.
- Permissions that users had already accepted stayed in place.
An extension can change owners while continuing to look familiar to everyone who installed it.

Why permissions matter
The permissions determine what a new owner could do with that inherited install base.
| Permission (Chrome) | What it enables (in plain terms) |
|---|---|
Host permissions (<all_urls> or specific sites) | Read and modify page content on matching sites; scrape forms; inject UI; alter what users see |
tabs | See open tabs, titles, and URLs; correlate activity across sites |
cookies | Read or modify cookies for permitted sites; can support session hijacking depending on scope |
storage | Persist data and configuration locally; useful for state, targeting rules, and feature flags |
scripting (MV3) | Inject scripts into pages with the right host permissions |
declarativeNetRequest | Modify or block requests; can support redirects or traffic manipulation |
activeTab | Temporary access to the current tab after a user gesture |
clipboardRead / clipboardWrite | Read or replace clipboard content |
downloads | Observe or influence downloads depending on context |
identity | Hook into Google identity flows |
management | View and manage installed extensions/apps; can be abused for profiling, identifying security tools, and interfering with the user’s extension environment |
alarms | Schedule background tasks; useful for persistence, delayed execution, or periodic beaconing |
webNavigation | Observe navigation events and track how users move across pages and sites |
webRequest | Observe and sometimes modify network traffic; powerful for surveillance, redirection, and traffic inspection depending on granted access and Chrome support |
contextMenus | Add right-click menu entries; can be abused for social engineering or to make malicious actions look like normal extension features |
notifications | Display browser notifications; can be abused for phishing prompts, fake alerts, or coercing user interaction |
offscreen | Run background/offscreen documents for tasks not visible to the user; can help hide processing or support stealthier workflows |
nativeMessaging | Communicate with a native application on the host; high risk because it bridges browser and endpoint |
What I bought
| Extension | Installs | Permissions | Why it mattered |
|---|---|---|---|
| Arabic Keyboard | 573 | activeTab, storage | Simple utility inheriting trust to become a high-value target. |
| Color Picker | 4 | storage, <all_urls> | Broad site access hidden behind a common utility. |
| Block Analytics | 12 | declarativeNetRequest, storage, tabs, downloads, *://*/* | Shows how traffic control can be bundled into a “privacy” tool. |
| Custom Cursor | 30 | storage, activeTab, scripting, <all_urls> | Cosmetic tool with enough access to do far more than change a cursor. |
| Save Image As PNG | 79 | contextMenus, activeTab, downloads, <all_urls> | Image tool with reach to touch page content and file workflows. |
| Extension Manager | 11 | management, storage | Can see and potentially interfere with the user’s other extensions. |
| LinkedIn Formatter | 13 | activeTab, scripting | Targeted example of trust inside a specific professional workflow. |
| View CSS | 990 | activeTab, scripting | How normal user interaction leads to code running on a live page. |

What a malicious owner could have done
The examples below are framed as impact demonstrations. No malicious updates were pushed to the store.
1. Arabic Keyboard: broad page access
What I inherited
A virtual keyboard built to help users type Arabic across websites, with broad page access.
What a malicious owner could have done
- Injected JavaScript into pages across a wide range of sites.
- Scraped visible form data or login fields on high-value pages.
- Modified page content to add phishing prompts or fake re-auth flows.

2. View CSS: user-triggered code injection
What I inherited
A CSS inspection extension with activeTab and scripting, designed to interact with the current page.
What a malicious owner could have done
- Injected JavaScript into the active page after a normal click.
- Read or modify visible page content on sensitive sites.
- Added fake prompts or altered trusted UI inside the current tab.

3. Extension Manager: control over the environment
What I inherited
An extension management tool with management and storage.
What a malicious owner could have done
- Enumerated the user’s installed extensions.
- Identified security or crypto-related tools for profiling.
- Interfered with protective extensions where possible.

The update path
Install count tells you how widely an extension is distributed. It says nothing about whether the current owner deserves your trust.
Ownership changes, sudden permission growth, and new external domains are worth watching. A buyer inherits the update path along with the extension.
Plenty of extension sales are legitimate. The part that worries me is how quietly an established extension can change hands.
I am working to improve the extensions I bought. You can follow that work on the Browser Extensions page.